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INDICTMENT SUFFICIENCY-THE LATTIMORE CASE
The District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in May, 1953, on the defendant's
motion to dismiss in the much-publicized
Lattimore case.' Owen Lattimore volunteered to
testify before the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee concerning charges of Communism and Communist sympathies made
against him in prior committee hearings.' As
a result of his twelve days of testimony before
the Committee, he was indicted on seven
counts of perjury. The first and most significant
charged perjury in the voluntary statement,
"I am not and have never been a sympathizer,
or any other kind of promoter of Communism
or Communist interests ....

-3 The defendant

challenged the first count on three principal
' United States v. Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507
(D. DC. 1953).
2 The Subcommittee acted by the authority of
Senate Resolution 366 (81st Congress, 2nd Session)
which authorized the Subcommittee to investigate
the extent, nature and effects of subversive activities
in the United States. 96 CONG. R c. 16872 (1950).
3 Hearings before Internal Security Sitbcommittee

on S.R. 366, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 2947 (1952).
The full text of the statement by Lattimore,
made on advice of counsel, is here set forth:
"All kinds of attempts have been made to
depict me as a Communist or a Soviet agent. I
have in fact been falsely identified as a follower
of the Communist line, or promoter of Communist interests. Now I want to make my position
clear. I am not interested in fine or technical
distinctions. I am not interested in graduations
or degrees of disloyalty. I have no use for fancy
legalistic distinctions. I am none of these things

grounds 4 : (1) That the indictment was insufficient under the Sixth Amendment and Rule
7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; (2) That testimony so subjective in
and never have been. I am not and have never
been a Communist, a Soviet agent, sympathizer,
or any other kind of promoter of Communism
or Communist interests, and all of these are
nonsense. I so testified long ago under oath
before the Tydings subcommittee and I do so
again." The remaining counts charged perjury
in the following statements:
(1) That, prior to 1950, Lattimore had not
been told one Ch'ao Ting Chi was a Communist.
(2) That in the late 1930's he did not know
that one Asiaoicus was a Communist.
(3) That he had not, when editor of "Pacific
Affairs", published articles by persons, other
than Russians, whom he knew to be Communists.
(4) That a luncheon conference between him
and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington was
held after the Hitler invasion of the Soviet
Union.
(5) That he had not been requested to and
did not in fact take care of the correspondence of
Lauchlin Currie while Currie was on a trip.
(6) That he had not made prearrangements
with the Communist party to get into Yenan.
4A preliminary ground urged for dismissal that
the testimony was immaterial, was properly rejected. Materiality, while vital in a prosceution
for perjury, need only be alleged in the indictment,
and proof may be postponed until trial. Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); United States
v. Fields, 6 F.R.D. 203 (D. DC. 1946); 2 WioGo.E,
EVIDENCE §§2549, 2550 (3d ed. 1940); see 80 A.L.R.
1443 for additional cases.
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nature could never be the basis of an indictment
or conviction for perjury; and (3) That the
inquiry upon which the charges were based
violated the First Amendment.5 The court
held that the first count must be dismissed as
violating both the First and Sixth Amendments.
The first contention of the defendant, that
the indictment was insufficient under the Sixth
Amendment, was accepted by the court as a
partial basis for dismissal. The test of sufficiency has been stated to be threefold: (1)
The indictment must be detailed enough to
inform the defendant of the charge with such
specificity that he may adequately prepare his
defense; (2) It must be so specific that the defendant, after a conviction or acquittal on it,
could successfully plead double jeopardy; and
(3) It must inform the court of the facts alleged
so that it may determine if they can support a
conviction.' Unless an indictment does this, it
will violate the Sixth Amendment right "... to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." ' A complaint so inadequate would
also violate Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal ProcedureO which provides "The indictment or information shall be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged."
Viewing the facts of the case, the court must
determine whether this indictment, charging
perjury in the statement that one did not
sympathize with or promote Communism or
Communist interests, is sufficient to allow the
defendant to prepare his defense. In this case,
the Government's proof of sympathies or promotion could extend back to the defendant's
birth; and, from the scope of the investigation,
5This paper deals primarily with points one
and two. For a more detailed treatment of the case
including First Amendment objections see; Comment: The Lattimore Case: CongressionalInvestigations and Ite Constitdion,49 Nw L. Rev 77 (1954).
6
Harper v. United States, 143 F.2d 795 (8th
Cir. 1944); United States v. Winnicki, 151 F.2d
56 (7th Cir. 1945); United States v. Krepper, 159
F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied 330 U.S. 824
(1947).
7U.S. CONST. AmEND. VI.

8FED. R. Crm6. P. 7 (c).

it seems certain that most, if not all charges,
would concern affairs taking place ten to fifteen
years before trial. It would seem impossible
from a practical standpoint for one to prepare
adequately a defense with absolutely no knowledge of what the prosecution might introduce
to prove his sympathies.
The cases arising on a motion to dismiss for
vagueness also offer light on the problem.
United States v. Hautau9 treats an indictment
very similar to the present one. There the defendant was charged with perjury under the
False Claims Acts when he swore in an affidavit
that he was not a Communist. The indictment
set forth everything in detail except that it
used the word "Communist." The charge was
held too vague, since "Communist" had different meanings to different people, and the
court could not know what the defendant
meant by the word, nor could the court itself
define the word in all-inclusive terms. By analogy, it is clear that an indictment charging
sympathy or promotion of Communism or Communist interests is even less sufficient. 0 In
United States v. Cruickshank," an indictment
charging the defendants with conspiring to
deny two Negroes the "several rights and
privileges of the Constitution" was held to
violate the requirement of sufficiency. The indictment in United States v. Ferranti,12 charging
price violation "on or about" a certain day was
held unconstitutionally vague where the act
violated had been amended very near the same
date. The court also reaffirmed an old 3 formula
9 43 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1942).
10Subsequent to the original preparation of this
paper the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that in this case the word "communist" was not in itself inherently vague because:
1) Lattimore himself had demonstrated an understanding of the word in his testimony; and 2) the
word has attained an accepted meaning and an
understanding of this meaning was disclosed in the
record of the hearing. United States v. Lattimore,
215 F.2d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
1192 U.S. 542 (1875).
1259 F. Supp. 1003 (D.N.J. 1944).
13 United States v. Potter, 56 Fed. 83 (1st Cir.
1892).
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providing that: "The accused must receive
sufficient information to enable him reasonably
to understand, not only the nature of the offense but the particular act or acts touching
which he must be prepared with his proof."
This indictment would seem less objectionable
than the first count in the Lattimore case, since
only two price formulas were involved, and it
would certainly be easier for one to prepare a
defense to meet either formula than to prove
his sympathies throughout his career.
From a review of the cases in which an indictment was held sufficient against a charge of
vagueness, it readily becomes apparent that
much more was set forth than here. 4 Viewed in
the perspective of common sense and case law,
Lattimore at best knew little of the charge
made against him and certainly not enough to
prepare an adequate defense. It would seem,
therefore, that the court properly ruled that
the indictment violates both the Sixth Amendment and Rule 7(c).
The second objection, that testimony so subjective in nature may never be made the basis
of a perjury indictment, also merits approval.
While closely related to the Sixth Amendment
issue, this appears to be primarily an evidentiary question, and, as such, must be approached from the standpoint of what evidence
will be admissible to prove the facts in issue."
To secure a conviction for false swearing in the
14 Typical of the indictments held good against
a charge of vagueness are: Walker v. United States,
93 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1938); Claiborne v. United
States, 77 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1935); United States v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs, Etc., 32 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C.
1940); Beard v. United States, 82 F.2d 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1936). In Koa Gora v. Territory of Hawaii,
152 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1946), cert denied, 328 U.S.
862 (1946), the court found sufficient an indictment charging defendant with "lewd and lascivious
conduct" on a certain day and at a particular place.
Francis H. Heller termed this the most uncertain
indictment that could be found sufficient. HELIER,
TnI

SIXTH

AmENDMENT

TO THE

CONSTITUTION

103-4 (1951). Even then,
it was found sufficient only because added details
would have offended the dignity of the court.
152 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE §§244-267 (3d ed.
1940).
OF TI

UNITED STATES
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statement, "I am not and have never been a
sympathizer, or any other kind of promoter of
Communism or Communist interests," the
Government must show: (1) What Communism
is and what Communist interests are; (2) What
constitutes sympathy or promotion of these."6
(3) What the defendant said on the stand; (4)
What the defendant believed he was doing at
the time he supposedly sympathized or promoted, 117 and (5) What the defendant believed
he had done at the time he testified. The last
two items point up the complexities inherent in
a perjury indictment based on allegedly false
testimony concerning past "sympathy." It
must be remembered that Lattimore is not
charged with having sympathized with Communism; he is charged, rather, with perjury in
having denied that he had at any time sympathized with Communism. It is therefore not
enough for the Government to present evidence
warranting the conclusion that Lattimore had
sympathized with Communism. The gist of the
indictment is that at the time he testified, he
knew that he had sympathized with Communism. The reasonable inferences to be drawn
from his earlier conduct are significant only to
16 The first two elements are not essential to the
Government's case if it can be shown that Lattimore thought he "sympathized or promoted"
Communism or Communist interests, since the
perjury statute requires only a falsification of one's
belief. However, since direct proof of Lattimore's
actual state of mind while testifying would be difficult, if not impossible to adduce, the Government
probably would rely on an "objective" test, necessitating definition of these terms.
7 This assumes that sympathy and promotion
are conscious attitudes. Certainly "sympathy,"
as commonly understood, implies consciousness.
While it might be argued that one could be a "promoter" without knowing it, it seems doubtful that
Lattimore used the term in this sense, for he said
he was not "a sympathizer, or any other kind of
promoter" thereby relating a promoter to a sympathizer.
If Lattimore was not aware of his sympathy or
promotion, he may not be held even though he did
in fact sympathize with and promote Communism,
since the applicable perjury statute requires that the
statement be wilfully false. D.C. CODE tit. 22,

§2501 (1951).
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the extent that they might constitute some
evidence as to his probable belief at the time
he testified. The basic inquiry is twofold and
almost entirely subjective, viz., what did the
defendant consider to be sympathy with Communism, and did he consider himself to have
embraced such a sympathy. The Committee
itself pointed up the difficulty of defining Communism and Communist sympathies, for although they spent the better part of their time
investigating Lattimore's "Communist sympathies," they did not reach a definition of the
word "Communist" acceptable to themselves
until the hearing was almost over.is Would it
be possible to say that the United States
Congress sympathized with Communism when
they rose as a body and cheered the Soviet
victory at Stalingrad; or that the Government
is in sympathy with Communism by virtue of
its support to Communist Yugoslavia; and
could it not be said that this is actual and
active promotion of Communism?"
It is true that evidence is often accepted to
prove one's state of mind,21 and from the common law we have the proposition that one
testifying to his belief may be indicted for
perjury. 21 However, in all such cases where an
indictment arose out of a statement of one's
belief, the issue was the belief or disbelief of a
clearly ascertainable fact. Lattimore is charged
with falsifying his belief as to his sympathy,
and sympathy is not a clearly ascertainable
fact, but rather a state of mind. In view of this
distinction, it would seem that authority for a
perjury indictment based upon one's belief of
a fact is not authority for an indictment based
upon one's belief concerning his mental state.
The Government must prove to the jury what
Lattimore's state of mind was at two widely
separated times-his belief at the time he testi18
Hearings, supra note 3, at 3526, 3527.
19Brief for Defendant, p. 24, United States v.
Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507 (D.D.C. 1953).
20Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459
(1885) ("The state of a man's mind is as much a
fact as the state of his digestion"); 2 WiGmoRE,
EvIDENCE
§§244, 266 (3d ed. 1940).
21
Rex. v. Pedley, 1 Leach 325 (1784); Regina v.
Schlesinger, 10 Q.B. 670, 116 Eng. Rep. 255 (1847).

fled and his sympathy at the time he supposedly
sympathized or promoted. The court appears
to be justified in rejecting such a radical extension of the proof of belief doctrine. This result
also seems proper in view of the high degree of
proof that must support a perjury indictment.
The federal courts require clear and convincing
evidence establishing the guilt of the defendant
to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable
doubt. 22 Direct evidence is required, and circumstantial evidence, no matter how convinc2
ing, will not in itself support a conviction. 1
Since the defendant asked in the alternative
for a bill of particulars, the court must decide
whether specificity would remedy the indictment. There is both statutoryU and case2 5
authority for granting such a bill where the
indictment is too vague to allow preparation of
defense. It is possible that with added information the indictment in the Latlimore case might
have survived the Sixth Amendment challenge, 26 but if, as the defendant charges, it
violates the First Amendment, it must fail
altogether. The opinion of the district court
does not state explicitly the relationship between the perjury indictment and the First
22

Hart v. United States, 131 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.
1942); Allen v. United States, 194 Fed. 664 (4th
Cir. 1912).
2 Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781 (9th
Cir.
24 1950).
Fmo. R. CP.m P. 7(f).
25United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246
(2d Cir. 1951); McMullen v. United States, 96
F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See 5 A.L.R.2d 444 for
additional cases.
26 It would appear to be possible to make the
indictment specific enough for the defendant to
prepare his defense if, for instance, the bill of particulars could allege that in the corridor, just prior to
his testimony, he had said, "I know I've sympathized with Communism all my life, but I intend
to tell the Committee that I have not."
On appeal however the circuit court held since
the grand jury must have had in mind a specific
meaning which it ascribed to the charge, it is now
too late for the prosecution to speculate by way of
added details just what the meaning was, and so a
bill of particulars should not be allowed. United
States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir.
1954).

